Published Works

1.The economics and Logistics of horse-drawn armies

British Journal for Military History (BJMH) Vol 7 Issue 1 Published 2021

Abstract:The capabilities of horse-drawn armies were recorded by contemporary observers and by later historians, nonetheless there has been a continuing debate regarding the capacity and workings of these forces, particularly once they were integrated with and then superseded by, newer forms of transport such as railways and motor vehicles. This paper argues that little attention has been paid to the wider economic environment in which these armies operated, and in turn the supply of these armies can be considered as an economic system in its own right.

You can dowload the article here

2. The influence of railways on military operations in the Russo-German War 1941-45

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 30 Issue 02 published May 2017

doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2017.1308120

How Soviet railway superiority made a significant impact on the course of the war

Abstract: In common with much of the historiography of the Russo-German War of 1941-45 there has been extensive study of the role of railways in the war with either side concentrating on different aspects of the subject. But to date there has little attempt to make a comparative study of the railways on both sides and to gauge the effect of differences in capacity on military operations and their outcomes. This lack has allowed one or both sides to obscure key failures and to deflect the influence on military operations away from railways. Yet the ubiquitous nature of railways for travel and transport in Russia, due to the large size of the country and the inability of motor vehicles to support operations beyond 3-400 km, meant that every military operation of the war was dependant on railways and the way in which they were used was a key element in their success or failure. The current study aims to compare operating practices between Soviet and German military railways, to give estimates of the railway capacity available to both sides and then to use this information to gauge the effect of this capacity on military operations.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

3. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army – Motor Transport 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 31 Issue 04 published December 2018

doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360

Abstract: Motor vehicles have always been regarded as an indicator of modernity, technological advancement and industrial progress, right from the time of the first motor car in 1885. The Soviet Union was no exception, and there is an extensive Soviet historiography of the development of motor transport and its use during the German-Soviet War. The aim of this article is to put the wartime military and economic use of Soviet vehicles into a wider context, highlighting how mechanization was not the only important variable in successful logistics. The case study here will be the role of transportation in the logistics of a Soviet combined arms army (общевойсковая армия) utilizing detailed primary source material from the pamyat-naroda.ru website.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

4. Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army – the rear

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol Issue published March 2021

doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2020.1845091

Abstract: This article sets out to examine the inner working of combined-arms armies logistics over the course of the war through the use of a series of seven reports contained within the Collection of Materials on the Experience of War’ and comparing these assessments with statistics from archival documents on two actual operations, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev in August 1943 and the Vistula-Oder Operation in January 1945. These results show that combined-arms armies gained their operational mobility from rapid re-establishment of railways and a carefully choreographed use of a small motor vehicle fleet, coupled with strict adherence to weight limits and living off the land by combat troops and their horse-drawn transport. This achievement of high mobility using limited means was a unique approach particularly tailored to the Red Army’s force structure and the Soviet Union’s available economic support.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript here

5. Logistics of the Tank Army - Uman-Botosani Operation

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 33 Issue 03 published December 2020

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360

Abstract: The Uman- Botosani Operation in January 1944 was the first occasion that a Tank Army managed to conduct a deep penetration operation against the German Army. Despite the Rasputitsa, Soviet armoured forces cut the Heeresgruppe in half and opened up a 300 km gap in their defences that was never really closed. Archival material on this operation now allows a new interpretation of this critical operation and comes to some surprising conclusions.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

6. Logistics and mobility of mechanized corps

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 34 Issue 2 published December 2021

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990556

Abstract: David Glantz described the Soviet use of forward detachments as the ‘tip of the spear’ of a tank army; small, armored, heavily armed and fully motorized groups wending their way through the German defenses, avoiding contact and operating up to 50 km in advance of the main body. This article seeks to examine the other end, the ‘butt of the spear’: the mechanized corps which provided the mass of infantry required to defend the bridgehead at the end of the offensive. Although they contained a large number of vehicles, the scale of allocation was nothing like that of Western armies and, given wartime shortages, even these were not met. So how did the mechanized corps keep up on the long distance operations of late 1944? This article analyzes the mobility and logistics of mechanized corps during the campaigns of 1945. Using this example, it will seek to explain how the units operated as part of the larger tank armies, and how their use evolved during the earlier campaigns of 1943-44.

You can read the Accepted Manuscript on this blog here

7. Managing Shortage: The role of Centre Bases of the NKO in overcoming supply constraints in the Red Army, 1941–1945

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 37 Issue 1 published May 2024

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2024.2340837

Abstract: In the winter of 1941, the Red Army faced a shell crisis brought on by the loss of its pre-war stocks due to the rapidity of the German advance that summer, the dislocation of industry due to evacuation to the Urals, and the large expansion in the size of the army. Materiel shortages during the battle for Moscow forced reform in both the approach to and administration of handling all manner of supplies. This saw the introduction of strict rationing of munitions supplies at the Front level, and the centralization of munitions distribution and stocks by the Rear in the Centre Bases of the NKO.(1 NKO refers to both to the department, the People’s Commissariat of Defense, and the office of the Commissar of Defense, held for most of the war by Joseph Stalin.)

This use of a centralized supply system allowed the Red Army to use a ‘just in time’ approach to supplying the Fronts that enabled it to make maximum use of a limited number of supplies and to maintain a high tempo of operations.

This paper was published as Open Source thanks to the support of University of East Anglia, so you can read it here on the Journal of Slavic Military Studies website

8. Patterns of War: A Re-interpretation of the Chronology of the German-Soviet War 1941–1945

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 36 Issue 2 published October 2023

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2023.2251305

Abstract: Most histories of the Soviet-German War 1941–1945 in English, German, and Russian, adopt a narrative framework based on the sequence of major battles, such as Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin. This approach portrays the war from a specific viewpoint reducing the importance of other fronts or secondary battles. Nevertheless, this study looks at an alternative narrative, the Soviet ‘canon of operations’, which was produced by the Military-Historical Department of the General Staff of the Red Army. This radically different account changes the viewpoint to a broad front war and alters our understanding of the issues facing the Soviet High Command and its resource management.

This paper was published as Open Source thanks to the support of University of East Anglia, so you can read it here on the Journal of Slavic Military Studies website

9. Logistics of the Front: The Power Behind Soviet Mobility

Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol 38 Issue 4 Pages 527-550 published November 2025

https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2025.2585667

Abstract: This article argues that the major contribution of the front was in restoring railway lines, by use of railway brigades and major units of the national railway, the NKPS. The fronts pushed forward, repaired railways and kept the combined-arms armies within a sustainable distance of a forward rail-head. Yet railway repair rates remained at First World War levels, so that fronts had to capture of important railway routes and prevent the enemy destroying them as they retreated, both of which lessened the repair burden. With the front creating transport routes behind the advance, the Red Army of the late war years was able to move at speed during its operations, despite using over a million horses.

This paper was published as Open Source thanks to the support of the Univeristy of East Anglia, so you can read it here on the Journal of Slavic Military Studies website

10. Routledge Handbook on the Russian/Soviet Military

edited by Alexander Hill published by Routledge in 2025

Chapter 25 Russian and Soviet Logistics from 1700 to the Present Day

Abstract: This chapter examines Russian and Soviet logistical provision to its forces from the 18th century through to the present, arguing that Russian and Soviet logistical provision has developed in a particular set of circumstances that has given them a specific nature. The author argues that in Russia's case, the very large size of the country, coupled with limited access to water-borne transport, led the military establishment to tend towards prizing mobility and the delivery of combat power in the short-term over sustainability – a tendency apparent in the early phases of the ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine.

Russian and Soviet Logistics from 1700 to the Present Day

11. Thesis: The Rear of the Red Army in the German-Soviet War 1941-1945

see this blog post

 

Other Works

  • A Response to ‘Russia’s Iron Horse and its Logistic Limitation in the Ukrainian War

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Volume 7, 2024 - Issue 2

Works in Preparation

Book Review: Three Books on Stalin - Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Viewing the War through the Lens of Logistics: The Rear of the Red Army during the German-Soviet War 1941-1945

Logistics and mobility of Cavalry-mechanized groups

The NKPS: Soviet Railways during the Soviet-German War