Short range operations in pursuit of a Kesselschlacht
The campaign of 1813-14 during the Befreiungskrieg was the last time that the Prussian/German Army conducted a sustained long distance operation beyond its home borders, before the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. After the defeat of Napoleon, the Prussian military sought to create a doctrine that envisaged a rapid mobilisation on the borders, a lightning advance into enemy territory to out manoeuvre the opposing army, followed by an encirclement battle to destroy it and then a pursuit to the enemy capital to seal the victory. The logistical needs of such a strategy required a dense railway network to allow the armies and suppies to gather on the border deployment areas within a matter of weeks and then sufficient unit transport accompanying the army, to carry enough supplies for three weeks campaigning. Items such as biscuits and concentrated Pea soup - "Erbswurst" reduced the weight and requesitioning along the route of march helped eke out stores. Although there was an attempt to follow Austrian practice and maintain a permanent waggon train to be used to form a Kriegs-Etappen or supply route, this was mainly concerned with maintaining the army after the main battle during the pursuit phase. In the same way the work of the Eisenbahnpioniere to restore the railways in the rear of the army was supposed to aid the army after the main battle. The key focus at all times was operational and short term logistical inconveniences were to be suffered in pursuit of the main aim of bringing the enmy army to battle.
The system was used in this way in the campaign of 1860, however its weaknesses were exposed in the French campaign of 1870, when sustained French resistance after the main battle caused the Prussians considerable problems. The Prussian Army had to spend weeks foraging and farming before the Siege of Paris as the supply lines were not fully established and the railways were blocked by French fortresses. Although this did not alter the final outcome, it did demonstrate the limits of Prussian military capability and their lack of interest in logistics.
