Economics

Why did German air power decline in effectiveness during the Second World War?

Why did German air power decline in effectiveness during the  Second World War?

The usual epithet applied to the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) is one of defeat as in the first six months of 1944 the Luftwaffe fighter defences were shot out of the skies over the Reich by American long-range fighters. By the time of the Normandy invasion, the Luftwaffe was unable to mount anything other than a token response to Allied air forces which had achieved air supremacy. The underlying causes for this situation were the insufficient numbers of planes, low levels of pilot training and outdated aircraft. The factors behind these causes were long standing and went right back to the formation of the Luftwaffe in 1933 and will be the subject of this essay.

Phillips O'Brien's "How the war was won"

Phillips O'Brien's "How the war was won"

Phillips O'Brien in his book 'How the war was won' has produced an attractive new way of understanding the Second World War in which he claims the Western Allies were the main contributors to victory by their creation of a new type of warfare - an air-sea 'super battlefield' and their destruction of the lion's share of the production of the German and Japanese war economies. He makes the valid point that by comparison the war's main land battles, such as Kursk only involved relatively small amounts of territory and destroyed only small amounts of cheap equipment such as tanks while the air-sea supper battlefield covered large parts of the globe and consumed well over half the German and Japanese economic output in aircraft alone before we take account of shipping.

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

In December 1941, the nature of the Second World War was changed irrevocably by the German defeat at the Battle of Moscow. Up to this point Germany had been able to win each of her individual wars in a single campaign, utilising the Heer's military expertise to overcome Germany's enemies one by one and using a fixed stock of military personnel and materiel. However the Soviet Union had managed to bend before the German storm and although her pre-war army had been destroyed, had created new armies and divisions in sufficient time to halt the German advance outside the capital, so forcing the need for a second campaign. This fact changed the nature of the war from one of single military operations to one of a series of campaigns utilising national economic output to equip and sustain multiple operations continuously over a period of years. From this point onwards, the level of mobilisation of a country's economy would be a significant factor in winning or losing the war.

Which poses the question what were the relative sizes of the German and Soviet economies? After all Germany could call on the resources of an occupied Europe while the USSR had lost large amounts of territory, around 60-80 million people and 40% of its economic base. By contrast one in every three 'German' soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front was not a German national.