Second World War

What were the main reasons for the German defeat in the East?

What were the main reasons for the German defeat in the East?

The defeat of Germany in the Second World War has been a subject that has fascinated historians ever since the events occurred. The reasons behind this have been a hotly debated topic ever since, none more so than the balance between eastern and western theatres and the reasons behind the defeat in the Soviet Union.[1] However this picture has been obscured by two main issues, the extent of the involvement of the German Army (Heer) in atrocities in the USSR, the so called ‘clean Wehrmacht’ myth and Cold War politics.

Why did the Germany’s Total War against the Soviet Union cause such suffering to the civilian population

Why did the Germany’s Total War against the Soviet Union cause such suffering to the civilian population

The German-Soviet War was a Total War, with the German state seeking the total destruction of the Soviet state, and the killing or enslavement its inhabitants. Which leads to the question of why was this war so destructive towards the indigenous population when Germany was seeking to gain the maximum resources from the region?

The Big Three or the Big Four? Why China failed to be recognised as a Great Power during the Second World War

The Big Three or the Big Four? Why China failed to be recognised as a Great Power during the Second World War

Nationalist China played a major role in the Second World War by engaging the main body of the Japanese Army. This prevented the Japanese Army either attacking the Soviet Union in the rear or reinforcing its defensive island chain in the Pacific and so causing America heavy casualties. In terms of suffering and destruction, China endured 20 million dead, 45 million refugees. Yet the Soviet Union was counted as one of the ‘Big Three’ great powers, while China was not, even though she was the fourth signatory on the Charter of the United Nations.

Why did German air power decline in effectiveness during the Second World War?

Why did German air power decline in effectiveness during the Second World War?

The usual epithet applied to the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) is one of defeat as in the first six months of 1944 the Luftwaffe fighter defences were shot out of the skies over the Reich by American long-range fighters. By the time of the Normandy invasion, the Luftwaffe was unable to mount anything other than a token response to Allied air forces which had achieved air supremacy. The underlying causes for this situation were the insufficient numbers of planes, low levels of pilot training and outdated aircraft. The factors behind these causes were long standing and went right back to the formation of the Luftwaffe in 1933 and will be the subject of this essay.

The deterioration in senior Allied command relationships in NW Europe 1944-45

The deterioration in senior Allied command relationships in NW Europe 1944-45

In September 1944, a major argument broke out between the Allied commanders during the Normandy Campaign. The roots of this argument went back a long way, to the very concept used by the Allies to fight wars, the dysfunctional Allied command structure used in the Mediterranean Campaign, and the assumptions made by COSSAC in the early planing stages of Overlord. The actual arguments may have been about the day to day tactical decisions but these were only a symptom of larger command problems.

Phillips O'Brien's "How the war was won"

Phillips O'Brien's "How the war was won"

Phillips O'Brien in his book 'How the war was won' has produced an attractive new way of understanding the Second World War in which he claims the Western Allies were the main contributors to victory by their creation of a new type of warfare - an air-sea 'super battlefield' and their destruction of the lion's share of the production of the German and Japanese war economies. He makes the valid point that by comparison the war's main land battles, such as Kursk only involved relatively small amounts of territory and destroyed only small amounts of cheap equipment such as tanks while the air-sea supper battlefield covered large parts of the globe and consumed well over half the German and Japanese economic output in aircraft alone before we take account of shipping.

A Who Dunnit of the Soviet-German War - solution

A Who Dunnit of the Soviet-German War - solution

In the previous post, I set you, the reader, the challenge of comparing both contemporary and current accounts of a single day of fighting at divisonal level during the Battle of Kursk. In this post I will give you some further information and lead you towards my conclusion. Of course you may have your own ideas.

Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport

Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport

Motor vehicles have always been regarded as an indicator of modernity, technological advancement, and industrial progress, right from the time of the first motor car in 1885. The Soviet Union was no exception, and there is an extensive Soviet historiography of the development of motor transport and its use during the German-Soviet War. The aim of this article is to put the wartime military and economic use of Soviet vehicles into a wider context, highlighting how mechanization was not the only important variable in successful logistics. The case study here will be the role of transportation in the logistics of a Soviet combined arms army (общевойсковая армия) utilizing detailed primary source material from the pamyat-naroda.ru website.

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

The contribution of Occupied Europe to the German wartime economy

In December 1941, the nature of the Second World War was changed irrevocably by the German defeat at the Battle of Moscow. Up to this point Germany had been able to win each of her individual wars in a single campaign, utilising the Heer's military expertise to overcome Germany's enemies one by one and using a fixed stock of military personnel and materiel. However the Soviet Union had managed to bend before the German storm and although her pre-war army had been destroyed, had created new armies and divisions in sufficient time to halt the German advance outside the capital, so forcing the need for a second campaign. This fact changed the nature of the war from one of single military operations to one of a series of campaigns utilising national economic output to equip and sustain multiple operations continuously over a period of years. From this point onwards, the level of mobilisation of a country's economy would be a significant factor in winning or losing the war.

Which poses the question what were the relative sizes of the German and Soviet economies? After all Germany could call on the resources of an occupied Europe while the USSR had lost large amounts of territory, around 60-80 million people and 40% of its economic base. By contrast one in every three 'German' soldiers fighting on the Eastern Front was not a German national.