“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES Volume 33 Issue 3 on 14 December 2020, See the final published article here https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2020.1824106 If you have access please click on this link to record your readership of this article."
Abstract
Soviet tank armies used a form of logistics different from that of Western armies that specifically allowed them a high degree of mobility and the ability to operate deeply behind enemy lines without fear of interruption. The build-up for offensives was provided by railways, and the offensives themselves were time limited, awaiting the arrival of the field armies and restored railway connections. Nonetheless, when used as part of a series of offensives, these long-range penetrations acted to break up the German defenses. The reason for choosing the Uman–Botoșani Operation for this study is that according to Soviet historiography, it represented the first occasion in which the ‘deep operation’ concept was successfully implemented. Western armies that specifically allowed them a high degree of mobility and the ability to operate deeply behind enemy lines without fear of interruption. The buildup for offensives was provided by railways, and the offensives themselves were time limited, awaiting the arrival of the field armies and restored railway connections. Nonetheless, when used as part of a series of offensives, these long-range penetrations acted to break up the German defenses. The reason for choosing the Uman–Botoșani Operation for this study is that according to Soviet historiography, it represented the first occasion in which the ‘deep operation’ concept was successfully implemented.
Introduction
By the time of the Great War, the growth in size of European armies had destroyed the Napoleonic concept of ‘a decisive battle and occupying the enemies capital city’ as a means of winning wars. Nor had that conflict produced an alternative strategy other than gnawing ones way through the enemy defenses by a series of battles, which was both immensely costly and slow. During the interwar period the search was on to find an alternative way of waging war, that leveraged combat power to capture territory and destroy enemy forces more quickly and at lower cost. The Soviet solution to this conundrum was the concept of ‘deep operations’ that stated:
“In short, a series of destructive operations conducted on logical principles and linked together by an uninterrupted pursuit may take the place of the decisive battle that was the form of engagement in armies of the past, which fought on shorter fronts.” Marshal Tukhachevsky1
However the implementation of this new operational art proved to be more difficult than at first thought. The ‘Stalingrad’ Strategic Operation had seen the successful double envelopment of a German Army during Operation ‘Uranus’ yet that particular set of circumstances were unlikely to occur again and the grandiose plans to exploit this victory had been consistently downgraded by logistical constraints, while ambitious raids, such as 24 Tank Corps’ one on Tatsinskaya airfield, had proved failures. In operation after operation during 1943, from Operation ‘Polkovodets Rumyantsev’ onward, the use of tank armies had failed to deliver the leverage promised by the new operational theory, as rates and depth of advance remained roughly comparable to those of combined arms armies supported by tank regiments.2 Given the huge investment in tank armies, in terms of industrial production, manpower and resources, was this the correct way to implement the theory and was the theory even right? It was a question of balance, finding the best force structure, establishing the optimum time to commit the Tank Army to the offensive, ensuring that it made a ‘clean breakthrough’ and was not intercepted by enemy reserves and that it remained concentrated for its advance into the depth. Yet surprisingly, the solution first appeared during the rasputitsa season of January 1944 with the Uman–Botoșani Operation which saw the 2, 5 Guards and 6 Tank Armies achieve penetrations of up to 372 km, average daily advances of up to 25 km, maximum rates of advance of 65 km for tank armies and 45 km for combined arms armies over a period of 20 days. Nor was this a one off, as subsequently the ‘Lvov-Sandomir’, ‘Lublin-Brest’ and ‘Vistula-Oder’ Operations either matched or exceeded these results. The leveraging effect on combat power of these ‘deep operations’ caused the German defenders great losses in both territory and personnel.
Historiography
The importance of this operation in early Soviet historiography is illustrated by the rapid assessment of the operation in the September-October 1944 issue of Sbornik materialov po izuchenii͡u opyta voĭny 3 and without precedent, for a second time in the 1955 Sbornik voenno-istoricheskikh materialov Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny №15 4, followed by an article in Voenno-istoricheskiĭ zhurnal (VIZh) in March 1969 5 and numerous references in Tankovye armii v nastuplenii of 1988.6 However after the initial article, there were no more anniversary ones in VIZh, which would indicate that the operation had started to fall out of favor. David Glantz has argued that this was due to the failure of the follow-on offensive of the ‘First Iasi–Kishinev’ Operation which might have damaged commander’s reputations.7 On the German side too, the offensive is largely forgotten, over shadowed by the successful escape from encirclement of the 1 Panzer Armee (PzArmee) in the Kamenets Polosky Pocket8 during the same period, although the successful battle of Targul Formos at the end of the operation is recounted, especially as it involved famous units such as Grossdeutchland Panzer Grenadier Division (PzGrD).
Outline of the ‘Uman–Botoșani’ Operation from the perspective of 2 Tank Army
By March 1944 the German Ostheer was in a difficult situation. Overall troop numbers had fallen from 3,138,000 on 1st July 1943 to 2,340,000 on 1st March 19449 and while there had been 405,409 casualties, only 221,893 replacements arrived between July 43 and January 44, which left units combat troops under strength and similarly short of equipment. Heeresgruppe Sud had been withdrawing since the previous August which increased the length of front that had to be held and by March gaps had started to appear between 1 PzArmee and 4 PzArmee as now the 850 km of front was held by just 33 divisions or an average of 26 km per division.10 In the centre of this line, AOK.8 fielded 152,637 personnel in 15 divisions holding a line that largely ran through open countryside without the benefit of defensive terrain features. On the army’s western flank VII Armeekorps held a line of 55 km with 5 infantry divisions running from west to east as follows: 82.Infanterie Division (ID), 75.ID, 34.ID, 198.ID and 4 GebirgsjägerDivision (GD) and the line continued onwards with XXXXVII Armeekorps as follows: 2 Fallschirmjäger Division (FsJgD), 13 Panzer Division (PD), 375.ID and 106.ID. In reserve was 14 PD positioned behind the west wing of XXXXVII.AK. The third Corps of AOK.8, XXXX.AK comprised 320.ID, 282.ID, 106.ID and SS PzGrD Totenkopf and was accompanied by PzGrD Grossdeutchland and 10.PzGrD subordinated from Heeresgruppe Sud.11
The Soviet forces facing them were arranged quite differently, with 40 Army covering the frontage of 82.ID, 75.ID and 34.ID while in the assault area 27 Army (93 Gd, 202, 3rd Airborne, 206, 337, 180 Rifle Divisions (RD) with 78 Rifle Division as Army reserve,) faced 198.ID and was followed by 2 Tank Army (2TA) and 6 Tank Army (6TA). To the east 52 Army (31, 254. 303, 252, 294, 373 and 116 Rifle Divisions,) faced 4.GD and was followed by 5 Guard Tank Army (5GTA) and 5 Guard Cavalry Corps while 4 Guard Army took on the east wing of 4.GD and the west wing of 2.FsJgD in a narrow frontage to the west of the town of Zvenigorodka. The assault frontage measured less than 25 km and struck little more than two German infantry divisions. Beyond Zvenigorodka, 53 Army covered almost the entire frontage of XXXXVII.AK and a supporting attack was organized against XXXX.AK by 5 and 7 Guard Armies.12
From the point of view of 27 Army, the offensive opened at 4.15am on 4 March (Moscow time) when four battalions conducted a reconnaissance in force to see if 198.ID had abandoned the first line of trenches, they had not, so the attack stalled. The following morning at 7.50am, a 56 minute artillery preparation was followed by a full assault by six divisions which by nightfall had advanced 7 km into the depths of the defenses, over-running the artillery positions and forcing 198.ID to retreat southwards, which exposed the rear of 34.ID and so forced them to retire westwards. The gap that opened up between these two divisions, by the end of the offensive would be 300 km wide, split AOK.8 in two and divided Heeresgruppe Sud from Heeresgruppe A. By the end of 6 March, 27 Army had advanced another 12-14 km and crossed to the western bank of the river, Gornyĭ Tikich pushing both 34.ID and 75.ID before them.13
Meanwhile by 16:00 on 3 March the assault units of 2 Tank Army (2TA) had moved forward from their concentration areas into the initial areas for the offensive and by 15:00 the following day, 2TA was completely concentrated. Five tanks from each brigade were told off to support the attack and ‘the first echelons of 16 and 3 Tank Corps were to advance directly behind the combat formations of 27 Army rifle divisions, supporting their advance by fire.’ Once the line Rubanyĭ Bridge — height 242.6 – Grudzka was reached, about 5 km past the German front line, the tank formations passed through the rifle divisions and continued the advance.14
By the end of the first day, the 2TA had arrived at the crossings over the river Gornyĭ Tikich river and by the following day had forced their way over to the opposite bank now 22 km into enemy territory. 7 March saw the 2TA advance some 17 km and fight to capture the town of Manʹkovka which was now defended by the counter attack forces comprising 1, 16 and 17 PD and 1 SS PGrD ‘Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler’ (LSSAH) and elements of 34, 75 and 198 ID. Although impressive in number of units, their combined strength was very weak and over the next few days, 2 TA pushed the defenders back 25 km to the city of Uman which was captured by the 10 March after which organized resistance collapsed. With nothing to hold them back the 16 and 3 Tank Corps raced forward 40 km in a day to the crossings over the Southern Bug river at Dzhulinka which were being defended by a single battalion of 4 GD. At this point in the campaign, 2 TA fielded just seven T-34, four Mk9 Valentines, five IS heavy tanks, four SU-152, seven SU-76 and one SU-85 assault guns and 82 guns and mortars. The 15 and 57 Motor Rifle Brigades forced the crossing by 14:00 on 13 March and 2TA advanced 25 km westwards that day, 30 km the following day and another 20 km on the 15 March arriving at the town of Vapni͡arka which was defended by 9 Infantry Regiment (Romanian 5 Infantry Division) and 6 Cavalry Regiment. By 4pm 16 Tank Corps had captured the town and railway station, together with 500 railway wagons, 2 locomotives, 300 vehicles and numerous supplies. However 3 Tank Corps had to remain behind while it waited for fuel to be brought up. The next day, 16 March saw 2TA advance 45 km to the crossings over the Dniester river and by 14:40 on the 17 March, 15 and 57 Motor Rifle Brigades were across the river forming a bridgehead. The struggle to get the armor across the river would last until the 24 March by which time 2TA numbered 17 T-34, 10 IS heavy tanks, six Mk9 Valentines, two SU-85 and 10 SU-76.15 During the twelve days of the advance, 2TA had traveled over 260 km, helped break through the German defensive lines, beaten off an armored counter attack, cut two large railway lines and crossed two major rivers.
Establishment of 2 Tank Army
State Defense Committee (GKO) Order 2791ss ‘On the formation of ten tank armies’ of 28 January 1943 stipulated that a tank army should consist of two tank corps and one mechanized corps. Yet neither of the two leading tank armies 2 Tank Army and 5 Guards Tank Army contained mechanized corps and only 6 Tank Army in the second echelon deployed 5 Mechanized Corps, while 7 Mechanized Corps was given an independent role and 5 Guard and 8 Mechanized Corps were held in Front reserve.16 Overall the establishment of 2 Tank Army changed constantly throughout the war as table 1 illustrates, however the trend was an increasing number of units and firepower although the winter of 1943/4 represented something of a low point.17
Combat troops
2 Tank Army (2TA) consisted on 5 March 1944 of 3 Tank Corps, 16 Tank Corps and 11 Separate Guards Tank Brigade together with 8 & 13 Separate Guards Heavy Tank Regiments, a separate Guards mortar regiment, a separate motorcycle battalion, a signals regiment and battalion and a battalion of army engineers.18 These combat troops fielded 17,042 personnel, 74 – 120mm & 74 – 82mm mortars, 36 – 76mm guns, 5 – 57mm guns, 19 – 45mm guns, 19 – 85mm AA guns used in anti-tank role, 33 rocket launchers (M-13), 1,358 motor vehicles with 41 armored vehicles and 147 tanks.19 In another report dated midnight 3 March, the number of operational armored vehicles fielded by the army is given as 124 – T-34, 19 – Valentine Mk9, 32 – IS-2, 43 – SU-76, 16 – SU-85, six – SU-152 for a total 175 tanks and 65 self propelled guns, an overall total of 240.20 One self propelled artillery regiment (SP Art Regt) does not appear in the earlier army list however it is listed in this report as 1219 SP Art Regt with seven SU85 and three SU-76 and so has been included in the above figures. The number of tanks that the army was supposed to field were 380 – T-34 and 30 – Valentine Mk9, a total of 410 which meant that it had 35% of its strength operational.21
Rear troops
In support of these, the army rear fielded 49 units including two fuel depots, depots for intendant, artillery, armored troops, military-technical supplies, refueling. sanitary and captured materials, three workshops, two bakeries, a road construction battalion, three motor transport battalions and a company for delivering fuel, a staff motor company, two tractor evacuation companies, one repair & recovery battalion, an assembly point for vehicles (SPAM) and a field repair base. The medical service provided three surgical field hospitals, a therapeutic field hospital, one for infectious diseases, an ambulance platoon, a bath & fumigation company and a sanitary epidemiological detachment. There was a field postal section, a base shop, two POW collection points and a herd of cattle. Finally for deployment forward, there were two each of army branch depots for fuel and artillery supply, together with a workshop.22
Transport
On the 1 March 1944, 2TA had an establishment of 217 light cars, 150 buses/pickups, 3,449 cargo and 353 special lorries, a total of 4,169 vehicles. Of these 140 were supposed to be imports, 110 Willies jeeps and 30 Studebaker lorries. In reality, there were 190 light cars (125 Willies,) 64 buses/pickups, 2,490 cargo and 300 special lorries, a total of 3,044 vehicles or 81% of establishment.23
Imported vehicles accounted for 1,315 vehicles, the main difference being in the cargo category which instead of having 2,136 1-tonne GAZ-AA trucks had 927 GAZ-AA, 345 Ford-6, 175 Chevrolet and 76 Dodges with a shortage of 613 vehicles. The establishment figure of 1,278 2-tonne ZIS-5 and 30 Studebakers actually had 565 Studebakers, 373 ZIS-5, 11 Internationals and four GMC, a total of 953 or 325 vehicles under establishment. All things considered in the cargo class, the army capacity was around 70% of what it should have been. Overall imports accounted for 36% of the fleet, made up of 66% cars, 38% cargo yet only 4% special lorries and 0% of buses. Clearly this tank army was being favored with the very best equipment, as by comparison, a combined-arms army in February 1945 fielded only 16% imported vehicles and relied to a large extent on trophy vehicles, of which the tank army seemingly had none.24
Which vehicles were actually running on the day is another matter, as the 1 March report shows the army with 2,460 or 67% of the fleet operational. Within this total there were wide variations as 90% of specials were running 70% of cars but only 65% of cargo lorries. The latter category shows 96% Studebakers, 85% Ford-6, 83% ZIS-5, 72% GAZ-AA and 45% Chevrolets were operational. Clearly the Chevrolets were failing to cope with the muddy conditions as 97 were in workshops and only 79 running. So new technology did not necessarily bring benefits and in this case did not compared well against the older, hard used Soviet types.
This report plainly refers to the total army fleet and the earlier quoted report25 shows 1,358 (+94 undergoing light repair) vehicles with combat units which would indicate around 1,000 vehicles in rear units, accounting for the difference in dates. Similarly we can gain an indication of the strength of the three army motor transport battalions from a report at the end of the operation on the 25 April26 which shows 255 OATb with 58 Studebaker, 80 Chevrolet (78 undergoing capital repair!) four ZIS tankers, three GAZ workshops and a single M-1 saloon car. 257 OATb has 76 Studebakers, 55 Chevrolet (all in capital repair,) three tankers, three workshops and a Willies. 850 OATb fielded 44 Studebaker, 24 ZIS-5 and 26 GAZ-AA with the usual three tankers, four workshops and a car. This gives a total of 387 vehicles in the three transport battalions. On 28 February, the three battalions had operational 158 Studebaker, 24 Chevrolet, 24 ZIS-5 and 20 GAZ-AA which gave them a capacity of 521t and the fleet was the same size on 18 March at the end of the operation27.
Operation of the Rear
The work of John G. Moore
Moore was not a military historian but rather a meteorologist, nonetheless he published a paper in the journal Military Affairs which was a mathematical model of the ways in which military transport was used and demonstrated that
“There are two systems….. First, by a continuous supply with wagons moving from the railhead to the front and returning. This system may be called a “supply train”. Second, by loading all the wagons of the army with supplies and accompanying the army on it’s advance. This may be termed an “expedition”.28
His calculations showed that for horse-drawn armies using a “supply train” an army could support itself at 6 days march from a rail-head, a distance of 180 km or using “an expedition” travel 14 days or a distance of 420 km.29 The clear advantage in mobility from freeing an army from a dependence on fixed supply lines remained right up to the modern day and was a key component in the supply of tank armies. Carrying the bulk of supplies on the vehicles of unit transport, left the tank army’s motor transport battalions the easier task of carrying forward of additional supplies, to meet specific shortages and to meet the changing requirements as the operation developed.
Moreover this point illustrates the reason why it was so important for the combined arms armies to create a ‘clean’ breakthrough during the initial stage of an offensive. Where field armies penetrated the entire depth of the enemy position in the initial days of the offensive, a tank army could be inserted into this gap and begin its mission, moving off into the operational depths undamaged with full supply lorries. However in the case of a partial breakthrough by the combined arms armies, where a tank army became embroiled in fighting during the early stages of the operation, it would set off into the operational depths both damaged and with its supply lorries half empty. This in turn could limit how long it could maintain the pursuit, since there was insufficient transport to carry forward the additional supplies while at the same time restoring the breakthrough losses.
Soviet accounting of supplies
The terms boekomplekt, zapravki, s/dacha, respectively munitions load, refill of fuel and days ration is a concept that runs through Soviet rear records. The concept for munitions is that each individual weapon has an allowance of munitions of a set number of pieces with a known weight as shown in table 2.30 The allowance for individual weapons would be scaled up by multiplying by the number of weapons in a unit, be it a company, battalion, brigade or division and then these numbers could be combined into a single average to express the overall munitions state, in number of boekomplekt. This allowed front and army rear officers a quick and easy way of seeing the state of supplies on a daily basis and then combining them again for reporting to higher authorities. A similar concept was applied with regard to fuel and rations so that the supply state of a military unit could be expressed as three numbers. Boekomplekt did not represent a days usage, as this varied widely depending on the intensity of fighting, typically a tank army used 0.1 in a pursuit, while heavy combat used 0.5-0.8 boekomplekt a day. Fuel used 0.2 zapravki a day, however during period of rapid advance or in this case, of mud choked roads, this could rise to 0.5 zapravki. S/dacha represented a single days rations for men and horses.
An example of tank army logistics:
In essence the constant demand of supplies, replacement personnel and equipment required that ultimately tank armies be supplied from railways. As illustrated in the previous section, the organic transport of a tank army allowed it to move a certain distance away from the railway for a period of time and the issue was providing sufficient army transport to sustain the tank army until railway supply could be restored. An example of this mechanism is found in Sbornik materialov po izuchenii͡u opyta voĭny № 1431 which examined the 3rd Guards Tank Army (3GTA) in the ‘Proshurovskoi’ Operation in March 1944 which ran almost concurrently with the ‘Uman–Botoșani’ Operation in the neighboring area of the 1st Ukrainian Front and although 3GTA only advanced some 130 km nonetheless it had to contend with the same bad weather and appalling bottomless roads during the raputiza period.
Preparation for the offensive
A key component in the marshaling of a tank army during the preparation for an offensive operation were the considerations of time and space. The front line zone was crowded with the 60th Field Army and breakthrough artillery units making their own preparations for the attack and the roads were choked with supplies and replacements moving between the unloading railway stations and the front. Due to this, 3GTA’s concentration area and rear depots (skladov) were located 110 km to the rear of its assembly area, along a 70 km corridor of railway track covering three railway stations. Combat units, rear headquarters and main depots clustered around these stations and drew their supplies from trains that arrived down the track.
By D-3 60th Army had finished moving its supplies up to the front line and traffic had begun reduce, which enabled the combat units of 3GTA to march forward into their assembly area 15 km behind the front and then on D-day to march forward 10 km into their initial area ready to be inserted into the battle. The rear headquarters (2nd echelon staff) joined them to oversee the supply situation and would keep about 30 km behind the army while it advanced. On D+1 the depots (skladov) were able to establish ‘advanced branch depots’ (golovnymi otdelenii͡ami skladov) at the railway station closest to the front which housed the 60th Army’s base and depots. There were two surgical hospitals and separate branch depots for munitions (one boekomplekt), fuel (one zapravki), rations (five s/dacha) which brought forward supplies by train from the main depots and forwarded these onward to 3GTA by road. By D+3, the tank army had advanced sufficiently far forward for the branch depots to begin making temporary dumps or ‘branch depot on the ground’ (Otdelenie sklada na grunte) around 25 km behind the advancing army. From here the transport companies of the tank corps collected the supplies and took them to the corps exchange point (KOP - Korpusnoĭ Obmennyĭ Punkt) or brigade exchange point (BROP) for distribution around the sub-units.
During the offensive
In order to accomplish this mission, 3GTA had three motor transport battalions (ОАТb) with 245 lorries of 490t capacity to connect the railway and ‘branch depots’ to the ‘branch depots on the ground’; motor transport companies which had 260 lorries of 584t capacity to move supplies from the ‘branch depot on the ground’ to the troops and unit transport of 1876 lorries of 2,362t capacity which gave the tank army a total transport fleet of 2,381 lorries of 3,441t capacity.32 According to this scheme, 14% of the transport capacity was devoted to moving supplies from the railway to the KOP, 17% from the KOP to the units and 69% hauled supplies at the units. At the start of the operation, 3GTA calculated one boekomplekt as 1400t, one zapravki as 404t and one s/dacha as 108t and possessed stocks distributed according to the figures shown in Table 3 which in addition shows the overall consumption of supplies during the operation.33
As can be seen the 3,436t capacity of the lorry fleet carried around 68% of the actual consumption during the operation which left the three OATb with their 490t capacity to bring up the remainder from the ‘branch depots’ in the rear. The army was fully self sufficient in munitions and food during the operation and living off the railway until just before the start of the offensive, it loaded up its transport and conducted a rapid ‘expedition’ into the depths of the enemy territory. In a very real sense, it achieved its mobility by unshackling the chains of logistics, albeit for a limited period, breaking the link between factory and soldier that tied modern armies via major transport links to the home country. The tank armies of the Red Army differed in this respect from the practice of the Western Allies and Germans which sought to maintain these connections, using convoys of motor vehicles which in turn determined the scope and extent of their offensives.34 However this freedom was time limited and carried a cost in terms of a higher risk of failure; if the combined arms armies did not catch up with the tank army and re-establish the logistical link, there was a very real possibility of its defeat and destruction. This risk was mitigated by good planning, setting achievable objectives and the tempo of operations, with neighboring fronts launching their own offensives to keep the enemy off balance.
It would be easy to overstate the case, as there did exist a limited transport link to the rear, in the case of 3GTA its three OATb, given that the tank army could not carry enough fuel to sustain itself during the entire operation. The 464t of fuel carried by the troops represented at best five days supply but the army as a whole only held stocks of 1,273t or 46% of the 2,763t it consumed. This represented an overall shortfall of both fuel and storage at army and front levels, which was made with deliveries from the Center; 160 railway tanker wagons (3,200t) in March and 123 wagons (2,460t) in April to replenish the depots.35 However moving the fuel forward from the station to the troops was difficult as the lorries only managed to drive 90 km a day through the mud and struggled to deliver the 84.4t fuel required a day. As the author of the report put it ‘Despite the measures taken, the situation with gasoline throughout the operation was very difficult, which greatly affected the offensive tempo of the army.’
Comparison with German practice
Logistics were not a strong point of the German army, as before 1941 all major German campaigns had been conducted within 500 km of the home border and concluded within a short period of time before supply became a limiting factor. Doctrine envisaged maintaining a continuous advance, keeping all units in supply and all operating at the same time so in this regard Operation Barbarossa represented a new departure which required a change in method, by adopting an enlarged fleet of heavy lorry columns, the Grosstransportraum (GTR), to connect the railways to the field armies. To solve the problem of fuel supply to the Panzer divisions, an additional section of GTR lorries was attached, called handkoffer (suitcases) to carry fuel. The supply columns (Kw.Kol.) of a Panzer-Division fielded 12 – 30t columns, three – 60t columns and three – 50 cubic meter (cbm) fuel columns with a total of 18 cars (le. PKW) 24 trucks (le. LKW) and 240 lorries (m. LKW) a total of 282 vehicles out of a total 4,500 soft vehicles in the division. The columns were able to haul 720t of supplies and had an attached 300t of GTR fuel transport.36 A Panzerkorps of two Panzer-Divisionen and one Infanterie-Division (motorisiert) was the German unit closest in size to a tank army, possessed around 1,800t of supply transport in addition to the unit transport.37
The German army used the term Verbrauchssatze or ‘unit of consumption’ to calculate fuel stocks and expenditure with 1 VS of 200 cubic metres (cbm) for a Panzer-Division or 1 VS of 160 cbm for a Infanterie-Division (motorisiert) which allowed them to drive 100km. In Russia it was found that 1 VS only allowed 75km travel and later on this allowance was reduced to 50km travel. The weight of 200 cubic meters of petrol is 140.7t or diesel is 170.2t however 250t were allowed for 1 VS to allow for lubricants and oils. Ammunition was measured in kalibereinheiten (railway wagon loads of 15t) and schußzahlen, ’shot numbers‘ with for example le.FH 10.5cm howitzer having 630 rounds in the former and 250 rounds in the latter unit.38
The stocks carried by Panzer-Division were for fuel, 3.5 VS on unit transport, 1 VS on the supply vehicles and 2-3 VS on the handkoffer which weighed around 1,500t, while the Panzerkorps totaled around 4,000t. Similarly for ammunition 750t was carried as the basic load of a Panzer-Division and 2,100t for the Panzerkorps.39
Expenditure varied according to operations, however a Panzer-Division would expect to use ½ VS. fuel (125t) and 1/10 schußzahlen a day (225t) or very roughly 350t a day with greater expenditure in heavy fighting and likewise Panzerkorps usage could exceed 1,000t a day in normal operations.40 This represented two to three train loads (a standard military train carried 450t load) a day and was the figure that the supply units aimed to deliver every day.
Comparing a tank army with Panzerkorps is not straightforward because the two units reflected the very different doctrines of the two armies in terms of establishment and replacements. In June 1941, 3 Panzergruppe contained LVII.Pz.K.with 12PD and 19PD and 18 Infanterie-Division (m) with 448 tanks and 45,000 men while a late war tank army had an establishment of 840 armored vehicles and 54,000 men. Yet the battle weary 2TA in March 1944 fielded 165 tanks and around 17,000 combat troops which made it around the same size as a single Panzer-Division and the 3GTA was no better. There are further differences in infantry and artillery, as a tank army fielded nothing larger than a field gun but had 60 SP guns, while a Panzer-Division had a full regiment of 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers.
Bearing these differences in mind, nonetheless it is possible to observe the varying approaches to logistics between the two military forces. Firstly the vehicle fleet available to the two units was markedly different, the tank army possessed 3,044 vehicles and 520t of transport capacity while a single Panzer-Division had 4,500 soft vehicles and 800t of transport capacity plus an additional 300t of GTR lorries. In terms of daily consumption, there are similarities in fuel: 02 zapravki (86t) or ½ VS. (125t) and munitions: >0.1 beokomplekt (20t) or 1/10 schußzahlen (75t) reflecting the unit‘s composition, however the main difference is in terms of deliveries with 3GTA needing 72t a day while a Panzer-Division would aim for 350t. This was a function of the planned, time limited Soviet operation and the fact that the tank army carried almost everything it needed on it vehicles except fuel, whereas the Panzer-Division envisaged continuous operations of unknown duration and distance. The outcome was that the far smaller Soviet transport fleet was able to deliver its requirements, while the larger German transport fleet inevitably started to lag behind in deliveries. In essence, by operating as a hybrid ‘expedition with deliveries’, the tank army gained freedom at the operational level, more so than the Panzer-Division which operated with a traditional ‘supply-train’.
The Rear of 2 Tank Army in the Uman–Botoșani Operation
Railways
Railways were intimately connected to the operation of tank armies as they remained the only means of replenishing them after an operation. As such 2TA benefited from by having main line access of the South Western Railway across the Dnieper at Kiev and down to Fastov, where a second main line ran through White Church (Belai͡a T͡serkovʹʹ) to Dnepropetrovsk. The army base was stationed at White Church with a road running through Medvin to the army concentration area. This remained the supply route while the tank army was part of 1 Ukrainian Front, however on 20 February 1944, 2TA was transferred to 2 Ukrainian Front and supply was switched to the south through the Odessa Railway, with the front regulating station at Poltava, crossing the Dneiper at Cherkassy and taking a secondary line to the stations at Signaevka and Shpola with a 40km road link to the new army base at Zvenigorodka. From here it was only 15km by road to the concentration areas. However the destruction of the railway bridge over the river Rosʹ prevented the transfer taking place before the operation with the army base remaining at White Church41 and this resulted in 2 Ukrainian Front regulating station having to direct trains through the area of the adjoining front which disrupted supplies.
Roads and facilities
White Church housed Army Headquarters №94, Artillery Depot №1144, Fuel Depot №2662 and Rations Depot №1223 together with an intendant depot, armored troops depot, artillery workshop, a supply company, Infection Hospital №4262, Therapeutic Hospital №2893 and 850 OATb together with 220 Fuel Supply Company. Other workshops, depots and hospitals were scattered to the north and east of White Church connected by railway and dirt roads. The main supply route was a dirt road which ran south east for 96km connecting White Church with the army assembly area at Bkzhanka passing through Tarashcha (40km from White Church) which housed 266 and 267 OATb, 170 Ambulance Platoon, a repair and recovery battalion, bath company and field laundry. The next town Koshevatoe (55km) served as the base for 2nd Echelon Headquarters, two surgical hospitals, an evacuation point and a branch sanitary depot while Luka (60km) contained a bakery and two tractor evacuation companies which was just as well, as from here onward the road turned into a swamp and lorries had to be towed through this section. Medvin (70km) was a major center containing the branch depots of Artillery Depot №1144, Fuel Depot №2662 and Rations Depot №1223, Surgical Hospital №5213 and 114 Road Construction Battalion, with a field bakery at Lisi͡anka (85km).42
Supply situation before start of the offensive
Before the build up for the offensive the supply situation was quite tight and critical in certain key categories with the tank army having 1.3 boekomplekt artillery shells with troops and 0.6 at the depots, 0.9 zapravki diesel with troops and 4.2 at the depots, 0.9 benzine grade 2 (gasoline) with troops and 0.3 at the depots, 3.7 s/dacha bread with troops and 5.0 at the depots on 28 February 1944 a week before the start of operations. An idea of the weights involved can be gained from the “Summary of the Rear Reports”43 with a calculated weight of 625t for one boekomplekt, 403t for one zapravki and 132t for one s/dacha plus 433 litres of the all important vodka.
Front headquarters had ordered that by 4 March ammunition stocks should be three boekomplekt of munitions with troops and one at the depots, three zapravki of fuel with troops and one at depots and five s/dacha with the troops, (with an extra 5 days dry rations for tank crews) and three at the depots. However the long distance between the army base and the troops and the poor state of the roads conspired to frustrate all efforts to achieve this as can be seen in graph 1 and there was little change in the supply situation even once operations began. The critical commodity was gasoline to fuel the trucks which remained at best 4 days supply although there was some variation between units as seen in graph 2.44
Not only did the OATb struggle to move supplies forward, they also struggled to transport rear units further forward before the start of the offensive, so that two surgical hospitals, an infection hospital and the OATb’s own base remained behind.
850 Separate Motor Transport Battalion (OATb)
This battalion was responsible for carrying 800t of fuel forward during the operation. The data shown in table 4 allows an average to be calculated which shows that the battalions lorries traveled 54 km a day (150km was the usual daily allowance,) and could have made four round trips, each lasting three days, covering 176km (or 88km there and back). This would seem to indicate that supplies could be hauled from the main depot at White Church down to the branch depot at Medvin and a second movement from Medvin down to the assembly area. Once the operation started, a flying depot of 12 vehicles (probably 220 Fuel Delivery Company which would have been equipped with tanker vehicles carrying around 30t,) followed the tank army and was topped up by whatever lorries could struggle down the road behind it.
266 Separate Motor Transport Battalion
This battalion hauled 608t of munitions, it’s lorries traveling slightly further than those of 850 OATb managing 69km a day yet their pattern was quite similar to the other battalion. Once the operation started, a flying depot of 10 vehicles followed closely behind the tank army and was topped up by munitions flown forward by aircraft from Medvin or whatever lorries could get through.
267 Separate Motor Transport Battalion
This battalion suffered a shortage of vehicles since the majority of it’s Chevrolet trucks were in the workshop and nonetheless it carried 630t of stores and 120t of munitions during the operation with a similar pattern to the others although on its return journeys it carried 240 wounded personnel to hospital.
Supplies during the operation
A first glance, a casual reader might be mistaken for thinking that 2 Tank Army was not running an expedition type operation, after all the lorries of the unit transport with the troops set off less than half full with 1.7 boekomplekt artillery munitions, 0.95 zapravki gasoline and 4.8 s/dacha bread,45 roughly 2,200t instead of the 3,800t mandated by the Front commander, yet in reality this was sufficient to carry out the operation originally envisaged by the army commander based on previous experience, with a limited penetration of 100 odd kilometers. The ammunition level was sufficient for a pursuit type operation, the limited fighting to cross the Gornyĭ Tikich river and to overcome the lack luster counter attack by the German Panzer-Divisionen around Uman.
However this operation penetrated up to 300km which raises the question of where the additional fuel and food came from to sustain this, given the poor state of the roads and the failure of the supply troops to keep up. By 18 March 2 Tank Army had 0.5 boekomplekt artillery munitions, 1.0 zapravki gasoline and 5.0 s/dacha bread which indicates considerable supplies of fuel reaching the army. The principal factor was the speed of disintegration of the German defense which caused a panicked withdrawal without the usual destruction and this resulted in the capture of a major fuel depot at Potash 60km from the starting point and only 25km to the north-east of Uman with 595t of fuel including 390t of gasoline, equivalent to 1.8 zapravki, more than sufficient to get the army to the end of the operation. There still remained issues around distribution and 3 Tank Corps recorded a two day delay due to lack of fuel on 13 and 14 March46.
Further trophies were captured at Uman including 2,000 vehicles, 40 tanks, 27 guns and two aircraft and rear troops were able to restore 10 mills producing 188t of flour, 4 bakeries producing 11t of bread and 4 dairies producing 2.6t of milk products. All told captured sources delivered a total of over 200t of food to the troops from local sources.
Conclusion
The tank army came of age in the ‘Uman–Botoșani’ Operation, as it both created and reaped the benefits of the ‘deep operation’ concept with both operational gains and heavy losses for the German defenders. This was achieved through a combination of factors, firstly the strategic over-stretch of the Ostheer as it sought to defend an ever longer line with fewer and fewer troops and secondly through the Soviet’s own understanding of the factors surrounding mobility.
In many ways the first factor would mirror the British Army’s experience six months later in Normandy47, with a series of successful yet frustratingly, indecisive battles through the Ukraine, that nonetheless wrote down the Germans reserves and created the conditions for a final series of deep operations that tore the German defences in the Ukraine asunder.
The seven month period from August 1943 also acted as a proving ground for the tank army concept as it sought to extract the maximum mobility from a combination of tracked vehicles, direct firepower, optimum weight of supplies and frugal living. This included changing the Mechanized Corps role to one that was more independent yet still linked, that reflected its lower mobility and higher supply demand. The Soviet’s use of the expedition method of supply suited both their need for high mobility and their perennial shortage of transport, combining this with a small supply train gave them flexibility to meet shortages in the later stages of the operation, with air freight adding a further element from 1944.
Although the Ukrainian Front’s offensives ran out of steam in April, as their forces outran the rebuilding of the railways, from this point onwards tank armies were able to conduct successful deep operations on virtually every occasion. The ‘Lvov-Sandomir’ Operation, Operation ‘Bagration’ and ‘Vistula-Oder’ Strategic Operation would all see changes and improvements in the force structure with larger and more capable forces, yet their logistics remained much the same.48
1 James J Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution.: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), p.178.
2 И. М. Ананьев, Танковые армии в наступлении. По опыну великой отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг. [Tank Army on the offensive: According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945] (Москва: Воннпое Издательство, 1988), p.412 Table 10.
3 Управление изучения опыта войны Генерального Штаба Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР, in Сборник Материалов По Изучению Опыта Войны [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. №.14 (Moskva, 1944), p.65.
4 От Военно-Исторического Управления Генерального Штаба ВC [Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR], ‘№15 Уманская Наступательная Операция Войск 2-Го Украинского Фронта Во Втором Ударе [Uman Offensive Operation of the Troops of 2 Ukranian Front in the Second Blow]’, Сборник Военно-Исторических Материалов Великой Отечественной Войны [Collection of Military-Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War] (Moskva, 1955), pp.5.
5 Ф. Данилов, ‘Уманско-Ботошанская Операция [Uman-Botosani Operation]’, Военно-Исторический Журнал [Military History Journal], no. 03 (1969): p.118-124.
6 И. М. Ананьев, Tankovye armii v nastuplenii, pp.315.
7 David M. Glantz, Red Storm Over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania (University Press of Kansas, 2007), pp.10.
8 Karl-Heinz Frieser, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Band 8: Die Ostfront 1943/44: der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten [The German Empire and the Second World War. Volume 8: The Eastern Front 1943/44: The War in the East and the surrounding fronts] (Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007), pp.432-450. While the Uman–Botoșani Operation merits but a single paragraph on page 435.
9 ‘Entwicklung der Istarke des Ostheeres’ (OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt., 1st July 43 to 1st July 44), T78 R414 H1/H172 Frame 6383128, US National Archives and Records Administration.
10 Frieser, Die Ostfront 1943/44, pp.433-4.
11 Rolf Hinze and Frederick P Steinhardt, Crucible of Combat: Germany’s Defensive Battles in the Ukraine, 1943-44, 2013; ‘Kriegsgliederung der 8. Armee. Stand vom: 4.3.44 and 12.3.44’ (AOK.8 Abt.Ia, 1944), T312 Roll 64 Item 58398/3 from Frame 7581796, US National Archives and Records Administration.
12 Voyenno-Nauchnoye Upravleniye General’nogo Shtaba and Voyenno-istoricheskiy otdel, ‘Boyevoy Sostav Sovetskoy Armii Za 1941-1945 Gg.’, pt. 1st March 1944, accessed 24 January 2018, http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/BoevojSostavSA/BoevojSostavSA.html; Альбом Схем Основных Операций Великой Отечественной Войны Советского Союза 1941-1945 Гг. [Album of Schemes of the Main Operations of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945.] (Москва: Геперальный Штаб Соиетской Армии [General Staff of Soviet Army], 1952).
13 ‘Журнал Боевых Действий 27 А (с 1 По 20 Марта 1944 Года) Разгром Усманской Группировки Противника [Military Log 27 A (from March 1 to March 20, 1944) the Rout of the Usmanskaya Group of the Enemy]’, 1 March 1944, Фонд: 240, Опись: 2779, Дело: 868, Лист начала документа в деле: 46, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113985350; Карта-План Операции Войск 27 А (4.3.44 г.) Приложение № 18 к Журналу Боевых Действий [Map-Plan of the Operation of Troops 27 A (4.3.44) Appendix No. 18 to the Combat Journal], 4 March 1944, 4 March 1944, Фонд: 381, Опись: 8378, Дело: 401, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100901075.
14 ‘Таблица Взаимодействия 27 А и 2 ТА На Период Наступательной Операции в Марте Месяце 1944 Года [Interaction Table of 27 A and 2 TA for the Period of the Offensive Operation in March 1944]’, 2 March 1944, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 197, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136534146.
15 Карта Обстановки 2 ТА За Период Боевых Действий с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 Года [Map of 2 TA Combat Route 5th to 18th March 1944], 5 March 1944, 5 March 1944, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 95, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100974906; ‘Журнал Боевых Действий 2 ТА [Combat Journal of 2 TA]’, 24 February 1944, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 1, Лист начала документа в деле: 104, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133034519.
16 От Военно-Исторического Управления Генерального Штаба ВC [Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR], ‘№15 Уманская Наступательная Операция Войск 2-Го Украинского Фронта Во Втором Ударе [Uman Offensive Operation of the Troops of 2 Ukranian Front in the Second Blow]’, p.30 table.8. The reference should read 5 Gd Mech Corps since 5 Mech Corps was deployed with 6TA. 5 Gd Mech Corps was swapped for 20 Tank Corps in 5 GTA from Front reserve.
17 Маршала ронетанковых войск Т. Богданова [Marshall of armoured troops Bogdanov], ‘"Доклад “О Боевом Использовании Танковой Армии, Танковой и Механизированной Дивизии, Их Организации и Вооружении” [Report “On the Combat Use of the Tank Army, Tank and Mechanized Division, Their Organization and Armament”]’, 5 May 1946, pp.12, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 476, Лист начала документа в деле: 1, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134681942; Маршала ронетанковых войск Т. Богданова [Marshall of armoured troops Bogdanov], ‘"Доклад “Рецензия На Доклад Командующего 2 Гв. ТА Маршала Бронетанковых Войск т. Богданова” [Review of the Report of the Commander of the 2nd Guards. The Marshal of the Armored Forces, Comrade Bogdanov]’, 5 May 1946, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 477, Лист начала документа в деле: 1, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134676880 to 92.
18 ‘Доклад о Боевых Действиях 2 ТА в Составе 2 УкрФ, Разгрому Уманьской Группировки Войск Противника с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 г. [Report on Combat Operations of 2 TA Part of 2 Ukrainian Front, in the Defeat of the Uman Group of Enemy Forces from March 5 to 18, 1944]’, 5 March 1944, p.31-33, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 223, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222803.
19 ‘Сведения о Боевом Составе Войск 2 ТА На 5 Марта 1944 г. [Information on the Combat Strength of the Troops of the 2nd TA.]’, 5 March 1955, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 207, Лист начала документа в деле: 48, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135838951.
20 ‘Справка о Состоянии Танкового Парка Войск 2 ТА На 24.00 3.3.1944 г. [Information about the State of the Tank Fleet of Troops 2 Tank Army at 24.00 on 3 March 1944.]’, 3 March 1944, 307, Inventory: 4148, Case: 266 l.90, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135857628.
21 ‘Справка о Наличии и Техническом Состоянии Танков 2 ТА [Certificate of the Availability and Technical Condition of Tanks 2 Tank Army]’, 2 February 1944, f.307 op.4148 d.263 l.1, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134493830.
22 ‘Ведомость Дислокации Тыловых Частей и Учреждений 2 ТА По Состоянию На 1 Марта 1944 г. [List of Locations of Rear Units and Formations of 2TA on 1 March 1944.]’, 1 March 1944, Фонд 307, Опись 4148, Дело 192, Документ 161, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136512585.
23 ‘Ведомость Наличия и Технического Состояния Автомашин По 2 ТА [ Statement on the Number and Technical Condition of Vehicles in 2 TA]’, 1 March 1944, Фонд: 307, Опись:4148, Дело: 263, Лист: 4., https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134493832.
24 H. G. W. Davie, ‘Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army — Motor Transport’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31, no. 4 (2 October 2018): p.494, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2018.1521360.
25 ‘Сведения о Боевом Составе Войск 2 ТА На 5 Марта 1944 г. [Information on the Combat Strength of the Troops of the 2nd TA.]’.
26 ‘Сведения Наличия и Техн. Состояния Автотранспорта 2 ТА [Report on Availability and Technical Condition of Motor Transport of 2 Tank Army]’, 25 April 1944, Фонд: 307, Опись: 4148, Дело: 260., https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134493839.
27 ‘Доклад о Боевых Действиях 2 ТА в Составе 2 УкрФ, Разгрому Уманьской Группировки Войск Противника с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 г. [Report on Combat Operations of 2 TA Part of 2 Ukrainian Front, in the Defeat of the Uman Group of Enemy Forces from March 5 to 18, 1944]’, p.85.
28 John G Moore, ‘Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War’, Military Affairs 24, no. 2 (1960): pp.106.
29 Assuming a typical transport fleet of 5,000 wagons, table III provides the figures for the “supply train” and table IV the figures for the “expedition”. The only restriction on the expedition was that it had to return to a depot or railhead before the last day. The model holds true for motor vehicles except that they travelled 150 km as opposed to 30 km in a day. However much of their five-fold distance advantage is offset by the rise in demand by modern weapons for munitions.
30 ‘Вес Одного Боевого Комплекта Боеприпасов На Каждый Вид Вооружения [The Weight of One Combat Set of Ammunition for Each Type of Weapon]’, 24 June 1943, Фонд: 299, Опись: 3070, Дело: 228, Лист начала документа в деле: 7, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134493091; ‘Нормы Всех Видов Боекомплектов в Штуках [Norms of All Types of Ammunition in Pieces]’, 24 June 1943, Фонд: 299, Опись: 3070, Дело: 228, Лист начала документа в деле: 8, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134493092.
31 Управление изучения опыта войны Генерального Штаба Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР, ‘XIII. Организация и Работа Тыла Танковой Армии в Наступлении [Operation of the Rear of a Tank Army in the Offensive]’, in Сборник Материалов По Изучению Опыта Войны [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. №.14 (Moskva, 1944), pp.194.
32 ‘Доклад о Работе Управления Тыла 3 Гв. ТА За Период Операции [Report on the Work of the Rear Headquarters 3rd Guards Tank Army during the Period of the Operation.]’, 31 March 1944, p.4, Фонд: 315, Опись: 4440, Дело: 220, Лист: 10., TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135100520. Interestingly the original report given here differs in detail with the Sbornik №14 as to the number of vehicles.
33 Управление изучения опыта войны Генерального Штаба Вооруженных Сил Союза ССР, pp.196 Tables 12,13,16,17.
34 Alfred Toppe, T-8 Problems of Supply in Far Reaching Operations., Foreign Military Studies Branch (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1951), vol. 24 p. 291.
35 ‘Доклад о Работе Управления Тыла 3 Гв. ТА За Период Операции [Report on the Work of the Rear Headquarters 3rd Guards Tank Army during the Period of the Operation.]’, p.13.
36 Niedhorster, Dr. Leo, Mechanized Army Divisons 22.6.1941, 2nd revised edition, vol. 3/I, German WWII Organisational Series, 2007, p.12, http://niehorster.org/011_germany/books_gwwii/index_vols.htm.
37 General Alfred Toppe and Lt General Rudolf Hofmann, P-190 Consumption and Attrition Rates Attendant to the Operation of German Army Group Center in Russia, 22 Jun-Dec 31 1941, Foreign Military Studies Branch (US Army, 1953), pp.95.
38 ‘H.Dv.g. 90 Versorgung des Feldheeres (V.d.F.) Teil II (geheime)’, 1941, 27, 424029928 (SWB catalog no.), Württembergische Landesbibliothek.
39 Toppe, T-8 Problems of Supply in Far Reaching Operations., vol. 3 p. 65.
40 Toppe, vol. 3 p. 72.
41 ‘Доклад о Боевых Действиях 2 ТА в Составе 2 УкрФ, Разгрому Уманьской Группировки Войск Противника с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 г. [Report on Combat Operations of 2 TA Part of 2 Ukrainian Front, in the Defeat of the Uman Group of Enemy Forces from March 5 to 18, 1944]’, p.85.
42 ‘Ведомость Дислокации Тыловых Частей и Учреждений 2 ТА По Состоянию На 1 Марта 1944 г. [List of Locations of Rear Units and Formations of 2TA on 1 March 1944.]’; Схема Дислокации Тыловых Частей и Учреждений 2 ТА По Состоянию На 25.2.44 Года [Scheme of Deployment of Rear Units and Formations 2TA on 25 February 1944], 25 February 1944, 25 February 1944, Фонд 307, Опись 4148, Дело 192, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136512576.
43 ‘Сводка По Тылу [Summary of the Rear]’, 5 March 1944, Фонд 307, Опись 4148, Дело 260. Лист: 122., TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=135885285.
44 ‘Доклад о Боевых Действиях 2 ТА в Составе 2 УкрФ, Разгрому Уманьской Группировки Войск Противника с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 г. [Report on Combat Operations of 2 TA Part of 2 Ukrainian Front, in the Defeat of the Uman Group of Enemy Forces from March 5 to 18, 1944]’, pp.83.
45 ‘Доклад о Боевых Действиях 2 ТА в Составе 2 УкрФ, Разгрому Уманьской Группировки Войск Противника с 5 По 18 Марта 1944 г. [Report on Combat Operations of 2 TA Part of 2 Ukrainian Front, in the Defeat of the Uman Group of Enemy Forces from March 5 to 18, 1944]’, p.87.
46 ‘Журнал Боевых Действий 2 ТА [Combat Journal of 2 TA]’, p.13.
47 John Buckley, Montys Men - the British Army and the Liberation of Europe. (Yale University Press, 2014), pp.26.
48 В. ОДИНЦОВ and В. ОВСЯННИКОВ, ‘Тыловое Обеспечение Подвижных Групп [Rear Supply of Mobile Groups]’, Военно-Исторический Журнал [Military History Journal] 1983, no. 03 (n.d.): pp.43.